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ABSTRACT

The occurrence of gay and lesbian parenting is far from unique. The
availability of second-parent adoptions for same-sex couples, however, is
far from common. Indeed, most states remain unclear as to the status of
such adoptions. Until marriage equality is secured for same-sex couples,
the struggle for second-parent adoptions will remain a critical consideration for gays and lesbians attempting to conform to the family law structure
currently in place.
* B.A. (2001), Miami University; J.D. (2008), Washington University School of Law.
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This Note begins from the premise that same-sex parenting is a viable
and acceptable parentage arrangement. It provides an overview of state
laws concerning same-sex second-parent adoptions, including past legislative and judicial action on the issue. An argument is then made for the best
course of action for securing greater protections for such familial situations. Based on a number of considerations,this Note advocates legislative
action as the preferred route for reform. Such legislation ultimately results
in a predictable, more enduring framework-allowing same-sex couples to
secure their legal parentage, and more importantly, providing children the
legal protection of both parents.
The argumentspresented in this Note are particularlyimportant in light
of the recent wave of state bans on gay marriage. As gay and lesbian advocacy groups work to secure other legal protections in the face of what appears to be growing opposition, this piece suggests a move away from the
more facially-successful judicial challenges to the less-utilized statutory
route.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two mothers have raised Hannah Brink since she left a Vietnamese
orphanage-Nancy Brink and Dana Bainbridge, a lesbian couple living in
Omaha.1 Hannah shares the last name of one of her mothers, but the
state only legally recognizes her other mother.2 Now in fifth grade,
Hannah explains: "I have two moms who love me and care for me. But
when I look at my birth certificate I see only one name. My birth certificate doesn't tell the truth about my life." 3 Because of this discrepancy, a
variety of Nebraska laws leave Hannah's future unsettled. For instance,
in relation to her unrecognized mother, Hannah may be ineligible for
health insurance, life insurance, and disability benefits.4 Without a will,

1. Martha Stoddard, Adoption Law Appeal Made; Girl Speaks for Bill Opening Door
to Unmarried Adults, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Mar. 21, 2007, at 1A.

2. Id. ("She shares the last name of one mother, the Rev. Nancy Brink, pastor of
North Side Christian Church of Omaha. But the State of Nebraska recognizes the other,
Dana Bainbridge, as her legal parent. Only Bainbridge's name appears on Hannah's adoption certificate.").
3. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hannah Brink's testimony before
the Nebraska Legislature Judiciary Committee in its consideration of Legislative Bill 571, a
proposal to expand adoption to both joint unmarried adoptions as well as second-parent
adoptions by unmarried partners).
4. Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and
Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 936 (2000) (explaining that the unrecognized co-parent may even be prevented from giving consent to needed procedures in a
medical emergency involving the child).
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5
Hannah could not inherit from her unrecognized mother. Finally, if her
recognized mother dies, her unrecognized mother would have no auto6
matic right to custody or visitation. As another lesbian mother similarly
accurately exsituated to the unrecognized mother in Hannah's situation
7
plains, "[U]nder the law, I am a stranger to my child."
The occurrence of gay and lesbian parenting is far from unique. Indeed, the 2000 Census reported 34.3% of lesbian8 couples raising children,
with 22.3% of gay male couples doing the same. An additional two million gay, lesbian, and bisexual Americans have an interest in pursing
adoption. 9 Hannah's situation demonstrates how the need for a secondparent adoption can typically arise in the context of gay and lesbian
parenting.1 ° A second-parent adoption allows a non-legal parent to become a legal parent of a child. 1' Similar to a step-parent adoption, second-parent adoptions do not require the current legal parent to
12
relinquish parental rights to the child. The legal climate surrounding

5. Id. (showing the dilemma faced by a potential parent who may die intestate). For a
detailed discussion of the issue of inheritance in second-parent adoptions, see Peter
Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner Adoption Paradigm:Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 351 (2005).
6. Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and
Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT1 L. REV. 933, 936 (2000) ("Apart from these tangible legal risks, there is the disturbing asymmetry between the profound emotional bonds
that may link a child to a non-biological parent and the law, which, in the absence of
second-parent adoption, is likely to treat that parent as a 'legal stranger' to the child.").
TODAY,
7. Joan Biskupic, Same-Sex Couples Redefining Family Law in USA, USA
2 17
-coverFeb. 18, 2003, at 1A,available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-0
lesbian
different
a
of
parent
unrecognized
the
samesex x.htm (quoting Donna Colley,
couple raising a child in Nebraska).
8. LISA BENNETr & GARY J. GATES, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE COST OF MARat
RIAGE INEQUALITY TO CHILDREN AND THEIR SAME-SEX PARENTS 3 (2004), available

http://www.hrc.org/documents/costkids.pdf (illustrating the prevalence of gay and lesbian
couples raising children in the United States). These statistics compare to 45.6% of married, heterosexual couples raising children and 43.1% of unmarried, heterosexual couples
doing the same. Id.
9. GARY J. GATES ET, AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2007), available at

http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/

411437-AdoptionFosterCare.pdf ("[O]ur estimate of two million gay, lesbian, or bisexual people who have ever considered adopting a child is likely to be a conservative one.").
10. John Ireland, 50 Ways to Adopt a Baby, ADVOCATE, Aug. 28, 2007, at 39, 39 (stating that second-parent adoption can arise in a variety of parentage situations, and may
include artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, or surrogacy, in addition to children
existing prior to the current same-sex relationship).
11. E.g., Diana Lauretta, Comment, Protecting the Child's Best Interest: Defending
Second-ParentAdoptions Granted Priorto the 2002 Enactment of CaliforniaAssembly Bill
25, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003) ("Second-parent adoptions have allowed

many children the benefit of having two, legally recognizable parents.").
12. Id.
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gay and lesbian parenting, however, remains unclear, being described as
"fractured,"' 3 "lagging behind, 14 and requiring gay couples to "delicately navigate and manipulate the system.",15 And in the words of one
commentator, "The status of same-sex second-parent adoption is
16
haziest.'
This Note has a modest goal. It begins by providing an overview of the
current state of the law with respect to second-parent adoptions by samesex couples, presenting both statutory reforms and judicial developments,
and assesses the outcome of the law on current second-parent rights (Part
II). In Part III, the Note considers the interrelationship of legislative and
judicial reforms and discusses the various advantages and disadvantages
of these two routes. Finally, Part IV concludes that legislative reform
offers the optimal route for same-sex couples to secure legal recognition
of parentage through second-parent adoption. While this piece is primarily targeted at advocacy groups working to secure greater legal protections for same-sex parents, it may also be used by state legislatures
considering expanded coverage for second-parent adoptions.
This Note's scope includes only same-sex couples seeking to secure second-parent adoptions. 7 This Note also proceeds under the assumption
that same-sex parenting presents a viable and acceptable option as "there
has been a tremendous shift in the nation's attitude toward gay parenting."" Moreover, the analysis and argument presented applies only in
One method in which courts have recognized the relationship between children and
their nonbiological parent is through second-parent adoptions. Much like stepparent
adoptions, second-parent adoptions allow the child's nonbiological parent to become
the child's legal parent. Courts grant the adoption without severing the parental rights
of the biological parent. Id.
13. Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 2007, at 142 (describing the
legal landscape of gay adoption).
14. Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex Couples:
Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 683 (describing the legal parentage of children
born into same-sex families).
15. John Ireland, 50 Ways to Adopt a Baby, ADVOCATE, Aug. 28, 2007, at 39, 39
(describing the states whose adoption laws are unclear with respect to gay and lesbian
couples).
16. Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 2007, at 142 (describing how
roughly three dozen states have unclear laws regarding same-sex second parent adoption).
17. The analysis of same-sex couples will apply to children both biologically and nonbiologically related to the parent. That is, the first parent could be either biologically related to the child, or could have initially adopted the child as a single person before, in the
present, seeking to add a same-sex partner as a legal parent through second-parent adoption. See supra note 10.
18. Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, March 2007, at 142, 284 (describing progressively changing attitudes on the subject). Indeed, all major child welfare organizations now accept that children of same-sex parents are no less healthy or well-adjusted
than those reared by their heterosexual counterparts. Id. The percentage of Americans
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the absence of a same-sex couple's right to marry.19 If a same-sex couple
could legally marry, the issue of second-parent adoption essentially beadoption. "20
comes moot as all states provide for so-called "step-parent
Finally, it is assumed that the key issue in a second-parent adoption by a
same-sex partner is the initial procurement of an adoption decree. This
works forward from the premise that another state would later give full
faith and credit to the initial state's adoption decree, thereby21eliminating
the threat of later legal challenge to the adoption's validity. Full faith
opposed to gay adoption has decreased from fifty-seven percent in 1999 to forty-eight percent in 2006. Id. Efforts to ban gay parenting have been far less successful than efforts to
ban gay marriage. Id. at 286. For a sampling of differing viewpoints regarding the advantages and disadvantages of same-sex parenting, see Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and
the Adoption of Children by Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. L REV. 643 (2004); Deborah L.
Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents? The Changing Legal
Landscape and the Struggle for ParentalEquality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23 (2006).
19. E.g., Susan E. Dalton, Protecting Our Parent-Child Relationships: Understanding
the Strengths and Weaknesses of Second-Parent Adoption, in QUEER FAMILIES, QUEER
POLITICs 215 (Mary Bernstein & Renate Reimann eds., 2001) (showing how second-parent
adoption is far from ideal in that, despite creating parental rights for both adults, the two
adults remain legal strangers to one another); Louise McGuire, ParentalRights of Gay and
Lesbian Couples: Will Legalizing Same-Sex MarriageMake a Difference?, 43 DUQ. L. REV.
273, 283-84 (2005) (noting the increased legal friction surrounding gay parenting given that
it appears unlikely that same-sex marriage will be legalized on a wide-spread basis for the
immediate time being).
20. Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parentingfor Same-Sex Couples in a
Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 4-5 (1999).
If a same-sex marriage were available, a married lesbian couple engaging in reproduction through artificial insemination would not need to take any steps at all to protect
the rights of the partner who did not carry the child, as the latter would be considered
to be in the same position as the husband of a heterosexual woman who is inseminated
with the semen of another man. In such a situation the law deems the husband the
legal parent of a child born as a result of the insemination, despite the absence of
genetic connection.
Also, if same-sex couples could marry, a single parent could consent to a step-parent
adoption by his or her partner, and the adoption could be completed within a few
months, at a minimal cost, in contrast to the lengthier independent adoption process.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See also Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 2007, at 142, 285 ("[I]t is
impossible to talk about gay parenting without talking about gay marriage, because the
inability to marry is a big part of what makes child rearing so fraught with legal difficulties
for gay parents."). For a discussion of inconsistencies in the judiciary's treatment of samesex marriage and adoption cases, see Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:Reconciling the InconsistenciesBetween Marriageand Adoption
Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247, 267-83 (2007). For further discussion of the role of same-sex
adoption in the same-sex marriage debate, see generally June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult Partnerships,35 CAP. U. L. REV. 341 (2006).
21. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[Flinal adoption
orders and decrees are judgments that are entitled to recognition by all other states under
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and credit treatment, however, then creates a question as to the jurisdictional requirements necessary for adoption.2 2
Statutes in only seventeen states require state residency as an eligibility
requirement for adoption, two of which are states expressly allowing
same-sex second-parent adoptions." Nine jurisdictions permitting samesex second-parent adoption, however, require no form of residency. 24 An
otherwise prohibited same-sex second-parent adoption may be avoided,
therefore, by securing the adoption decree in a state that has no prohibition on the adoption as well as no residency requirement.2 5 This path of
adoption, however, is less than ideal as a long-term solution for many
reasons, the primary one being the many logistical complications necessarily entailed. Moreover, widespread use of this option may lead to the
enactment of residency restrictions by additional states.

the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Therefore, Oklahoma's adoption amendment is unconstitutional in its refusal to recognize final adoption orders of other states that permit adoption
by same-sex couples.").
22. See Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction,and Judgment Issues in Interstate Adoption Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2003).
[T]o require that adoption jurisdiction be limited to states in which all interested parties are domiciled would be undesirable, because it would unduly restrict adoptions
that are in the best interests of the child in question. Therefore, adoption jurisdiction
also exists when the child and the adoptive parents are domiciled in different states, as
long as personal jurisdiction exists over both parties or, if this is lacking in the case of
the child, the state has personal jurisdiction over the person having legal custody of
the child so that it may protect all the necessary interests. Id.
23. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, WHO MAY ADOPT,BE ADOPTED, OR PLACE A
CHILD FOR ADOPTION? 2 (2006), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/
laws.policies/statutes/parties.pdf (showing Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming to have residency requirements ranging
from sixty days to one year). Some states create exceptions to residency requirements
including, for example, agency adoptions or special needs adoption. Id.
24. Compare id. (listing states with residency requirements), with FAMILY EQUAL.
COUNCIL, STATE-BY-STATE: SECOND PARENT ADOPTION LAWS 1-2 (2008), available at
http://www.familyequality.org/resources/publications/secondparent-withcitations.pdf (listing jurisdictions allowing same-sex second-parent adoption, which include California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont).
25. See, e.g., Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (Va. 2005) (requiring
issuance of new birth certificates with both adoptive parents for children born in Virginia
who were later adopted in other states by same-sex parents). Davenport involved children
who were no longer living in Virginia, but the decision did not appear to hinge on the
current residency of the children or parents, but rather the existence of an out-of-state
adoption. See id. "The sole issue in this case is the enforcement of the directive of the
General Assembly concerning the issuance of new certificates of birth upon receipt of notice of an out-of-state adoption." Id.
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II.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

The majority of same-sex second-parent adoptions must confront the
dilemma of whether the adoption necessarily terminates the legal status
of the current legal parent. 26 Adoption is a creature of state statutes, the
''cut-off" provisions of which often require parents to terminate all legal
rights to the child in order for the adoption to subsequently proceed.27
These same statutes, however, generally exempt step-parent adoptions, in
which a birth parent's new spouse adopts the child, while the first parent
retains full legal rights. 28 One issue for same-sex couples, therefore,
emerges from the fact that the same-sex couple cannot marry (with the
exception of Massachusetts), and therefore cannot use the step-parent
adoption scheme. 29 An equally significant problem arises from the traditional belief that a child can have only one mother and one father, a notion that is automatically rattled by same-sex parents. 30 State responses
to the same-sex second-parent adoption dilemma have come in the form

26. E.g., Heather Buethe, Note, Second-Parent Adoption and the Equitable Parent
Doctrine: The Future of Custody and Visitation Rights for Same-Sex Partnersin Missouri, 20
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 283, 294 (2006) ("The toughest barrier that courts have had to
overcome in recognizing second-parent adoptions via existing adoption statutes is the cutoff provision, which requires termination of birth parents' rights prior to adoption
proceedings.").
27. Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and
Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 937 (2000) ("[T]ermination of the
birth parents' legal rights is consistent with the basic principle that the adoption extinguishes an existing set of family relationships and creates a new set in its place. The adoptive parents, that is, acquire all the rights and responsibilities that are relinquished by the
birth parents.").
28. Id. (discussing Wisconsin's cut-off provision, with the exception for step-parents).
An example of the typical statutory language reads as follows:
After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of parent and child between the
adopted person and the adopted person's birth parents and the relationship between
the adopted person and all persons whose relationship to the adopted person is derived through those birth parents shall be completely altered and all the rights, duties,
and other legal consequences of those relationships shall cease to exist, unless the
birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive parent, in which case those relationships
shall be completely altered and those rights, duties, and other legal consequences shall
cease to exist only with respect to the birth parent who is not the spouse of the adoptive parent and all persons whose relationship to the adopted person is derived
through that birth parent. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.92(2) (West 2006)).
29. Id. at 938 (assuming that states providing for civil unions, such as Vermont, Connecticut, and New Jersey, in which rights comparable to marriage are provided for, also
likely prevent the need for a provision or interpretation in addition to the step-parent
exception).
30. But cf. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005) ("We perceive no
reason why both parents of a child cannot be women. That result now is possible under the
current version of the domestic partnership statutes, which took effect this year.").
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of both statutes and judicial decisions, and have both permitted and prohibited the .second-parent adoption by a same-sex partner.3 1
A.

Statutes Permitting Second-ParentAdoptions

Currently, only four states 32 provide statutory protection for same-sex
parents to complete second-parent adoptions: California,3 3 Colorado,3 4
Connecticut, 35 and Vermont. 36 These statutes specifically allow for second-parent adoptions by persons other than step-parents. The Vermont
statute provides perhaps the most explicit authorization, stating: "If a
family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner, and adoption is
in the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent may adopt a child
of the parent. Termination of the parent's parental rights is unnecessary
in an adoption under this subsection."3 7
Interestingly, judicial decisions precede many of these statutes. The
Vermont statute, for instance, codified the Vermont Supreme Court's decision from In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 38 holding that the rights of a biological parent need not be terminated when children are adopted by a
person to whom the biological person is not married, and the adoption is

31.

NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION IN THE U.S.

(2007), availableat, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/2nd-parent
_adoption 5_07.pdf (showing a graphical representation of the current state of the law
regarding second-parent adoption).
32. Pennsylvania could be seen as a fifth state permitting same-sex second-parent
adoptions in that its statute allows the court to permit adoptions in the best interest of a
child, despite all statutory conditions not being fulfilled. See In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803
A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002) ("The exercise of such discretion does not open the door to
unlimited adoptions by legally unrelated adults. Such decisions will always be confined by a
finding of cause and a determination of the best interests of the child in each individual
case.").
33. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 2007) ("A domestic partner ...desiring to adopt a
child of his or her domestic partner may for that purpose file a petition in the county in
which the petitioner resides."). Same-sex couples that have registered in California's domestic partner registry "may adopt each other's children using the simpler process available to stepparents." STATE BAR OF CAL. COMM. ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, REGISTERED
DOMESTIC PARTNERS IN CALIFORNIA 5 (2006), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/cal
bar/pdfs/comcom/C50GIDDomestic-Partners.pdf.
34. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203 (West 2007) (allowing a second-parent adoption after written and verified consent by sole legal parent).
35. CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 2008) (requiring parental responsibility
to be shared).
36. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2008) (giving specific allowance for a "parent's
partner" to adopt).
37. Id.
38. 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
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in the best interests of the children. 39 The court explained that "[w]hen
social mores change, governing statutes must be interpreted to allow for
those changes in a manner that does not frustrate the purposes behind
their enactment. 4 ° The Vermont statute, therefore, confirmed the
court's reasoning and formally clarified that same-sex couples were indeed eligible for second-parent adoption procedures.
While the Vermont statute codified a previous decision, Connecticut's
statute superseded and reversed the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision from In re Adoption of Baby Z.,41 which had held that a same-sex
couple was not within the parties capable of executing a second-parent
adoption.42 Similarly, Colorado's 2007 statute 43 not only superseded a
1996 appellate decision prohibiting a second-parent adoption,4 4 but also
followed on the heels of a 2006 constitutional amendment banning samesex marriage.45 Despite sponsorship by the only openly gay lawmaker in
the state, the Colorado legislation was marketed as protection for children being raised in nontraditional families, including not only same-sex
couples, but also grandparents, aunts and uncles, and other relatives providing care for a child.46 Not surprisingly, the opposition was led primarily by Republicans arguing the bill sought to advance the homosexual

39. In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993) ("We hold that when
the family unit is comprised of the natural mother and her partner, and the adoption is in
the best interests of the children, terminating the natural mother's rights is unreasonable
and unnecessary.").
40. Id. at 1275 (fulfilling the intent of the statute by allowing adoptions when in the
best interest of the child).
41. 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999), superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STA. ANN. § 45a724 (West 2008).
42. In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1050 (Conn. 1999), superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STA. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 2008).
43. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203 (West 2007).

44. In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), superseded by
statute, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203 (West 2007).
45. Tim Padgett, Gay Family Values, TIME, July 16, 2007, at 51, available at http:H
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,164041 1,00.html.
So they were disappointed last fall when Colorado voters joined the bandwagon of
states that ban same-sex marriage and civil unions. But the couple won a measure of
vindication this spring when Governor Bill Ritter signed a bill making Colorado the
10th state to allow gay and lesbian partners to adopt children as couples instead of
restricting parental rights to one partner. Id.
46. April M. Washington, Senate OKs Adoption by Same-Sex Couples, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/
government/article/0,2777,DRMN_23906_5479666,00.html ("Sen. Jennifer Veiga, D-Denver, contends that same-sex couples, grandparents, aunts and uncles, and other relatives
have a hard time getting government benefits and providing health care coverage to children they're raising because Colorado's adoption law allows only married couples or singles-gay or straight-to adopt.").
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agenda.47 Ultimately, a primarily partisan vote approved the Colorado
statute as a free-standing piece of legislation.4 8
California provides an interesting variation in that its appellate decision of significance arose after the state's adoption statute provided the
right to second-parent adoptions to registered partners. Sharon S. v. Superior Court of San Diego County4 9 confirmed the validity of those samesex second-parent adoptions secured prior to the enactment of the state's
domestic partner registry. The decision explained that the legislature's
conferring of second-parent adoptions by registered couples was not an
assertion that the act was previously unavailable, but rather streamlined a
previously existing process.5" The impact of this decision, therefore, was
significant for its validation of a multitude of previous adoptions, but has
little lasting impact, as California's statutory provisions now expressly
provide for the adoption procedure.5 1
B. Statutes ProhibitingSecond-ParentAdoptions
On the other side of the statutory spectrum, a few states categorically
prohibit adoptions by gays and lesbians: Florida,5 2 Mississippi,5 3 and
Utah.54 Perhaps the most explicit of these prohibitions, the Florida statute provides that "[n]o person eligible to adopt under this statute may
adopt if that person is a homosexual." 5 5 Functionally equivalent, Mississippi's statute prohibits "[a]doption by couples of the same gender, 56 and
47. Id. ("Sen. Scott Renfroe, R-Greeley [said] 'It's not about protecting children. It is
an attack on the traditional family. It undermines the traditional marriage structure that we
need to keep strong and sacred."').
48. H.B. 1330, 66th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007) (passing 39-25 in the
Colorado House of Representatives and 20-15 in the Colorado Senate).
49. 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
50. Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 572 (Cal. 2003) ("[It] simply streamlines the
adoption process for a subset of those who already were accessing second parent procedures, much as occurred in 1931 when the Legislature streamlined stepparent adoption
itself.").
51. CAL.

FAM.

CODE

§ 9000 (West

2007)

(removing

the

need

for judicial

interpretation).
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2007) (specifically banning homosexual
adoption).
53. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (West 2004) (banning homosexual adoption by
prohibiting same gender couples from adopting).
54. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117 (West 2008) (disqualifying individuals in unmarried sexual relationships from adopting, thus banning homosexuals who are unable to legally marry).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2007); see Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming a district court's holding which essentially upheld the Florida statute against a constitutional challenge).
56. MIss. CODE. ANN. § 93-17-3 (West 2004).
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Utah's statute provides that "[a] child may not be adopted by a person
who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding
marriage." 57 There is a continual effort in many states to either pass similar legislation or advance ballot initiatives,5 8 although a number of attempts to do so have proven unsuccessful. 59
Given the statute's language, a same-sex second-parent adoption is
necessarily prohibited in Florida as the second-parent would be a homosexual. The same result likely applies in Utah. The outcome in Mississippi is unclear as the statute's prohibition applies to a couple and a
second-parent adoption would not technically involve a couple, but
rather the single adoption by the second parent. It should be noted, however, that at least one survey identifies the status of same-sex secondparent adoption in all three states as "unclear."' 60
C. Judicial Decisions Permitting Second-Parent Adoptions

Appellate court opinions of seven jurisdictions currently permit samesex second-parent adoptions: the District of Columbia, 61 Illinois, 62 Indi-

57. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117 (West 2008); see also id. § 78B-6-103 (West 2008)
("'[C]ohabiting' means residing with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person.").
58. See Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up, USA TODAY, Feb. 21,
2006, at 1A,available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20-gay-adoption-x.
htm (explaining that sixteen states are the focus of such efforts); Amanda Paulson, Several
States Weigh Ban on Gay Adoption, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 15, 2006, at 2, availa-

ble at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0315/p02s02-ussc.html ("Seven states introduced
bills last year that would prevent gays or lesbians from adopting, and a few states-Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee, among others-have indicated a willingness to
introduce constitutional amendments in future years."); see also, e.g., Arkansas: Vote on
Gay Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2008, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/08/26/us/26brfs-voteongayado-brf.html (detailing the certification of signatures necessary for a November 2008 ballot initiative in Arkansas to ban unmarried couples, thus
including gay men and lesbians, from becoming foster or adoptive parents).
59. See Jeff LeBlanc, My Two Moms: An Analysis of the Status of Homosexual Adoption and the Challengesto Its Acceptance, 27 J.Juv. L. 95, 99-100 (2006) (outlining a number of failed attempts to add discriminatory restrictions into state adoption statutes). Also
shown is the history of New Hampshire's addition of, and later removal of, restrictions on
gay adoption. Id.
60. See NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION IN THE

U.S. (2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/2ndparent-adoption_.507.pdf (showing a graphical representation of states treatment of second-parent adoption in the United States).
61. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995) ("Accordingly, adoption petitions by
unmarried couples shall be granted or rejected on a case-by-case basis in the best interests
of the prospective adoptee.").
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ana,63 Massachusetts, 64 New York,65 New Jersey,66 and Pennsylvania.6 7
Throughout these cases, courts employed a variety of canons of statutory
interpretation to ultimately authorize the second-parent adoption.6 8 For
instance, many courts referenced the need for liberal construction of the
statute, concluding that exemption from the cut-off provision was in the
best interest of the child. 69 Similarly, many courts concluded that the
plain meaning of the statute would produce "absurd results" by requiring
termination of the parental rights of a parent seeking to maintain their
current parentage status. 7' An Indiana opinion provides an accurate
summary of this position, concluding:

62. In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("A construction that excludes
all unmarried persons, regardless of sex, from petitioning to adopt jointly, does not give
paramount consideration to the best interests and welfare of the persons to be adopted.").
63. In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ("While
Indiana statutory law does not expressly divest the rights of an adoptive parent in the event
of a second-parent adoption, neither does it expressly permit two unmarried adults to simultaneously exercise these rights with respect to an adopted child." (quoting In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))).
64. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1993) ("There is nothing on the
face of the statute which precludes the joint adoption of a child by two unmarried cohabitants such as the petitioners.").
65. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 403 (N.Y. 1995) ("[C]omplete severance of the natural relationship [is] not necessary when the adopted person remain[s] within the natural
family unit as a result of an intrafamily adoption." (quoting In re Estate of Seaman, 583
N.E.2d 294, 300 (N.Y. 1991))).
66. In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1995) ("[T]he stepparent provision of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:3-50 should not be narrowly
interpreted so as to defeat an adoption that is clearly in the child's best interests.").
67. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002) ("When the requisite
cause is demonstrated, Section 2901 affords the trial court discretion to decree the adoption without termination of the legal parent's rights pursuant to Section 2711(d)."). For a
detailed examination of second-parent adoption in Pennsylvania, see generally Martha
Elizabeth Lieberman, Note, The Status of Same Sex Adoption in the Keystone State Subsequent to the State Supreme Court's Decision in Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.G., 12 J.L. &
POL'Y 287 (2003).
68. See Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures
and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 938-39 (2000); Heather Buethe,
Note, Second-Parent Adoption and the Equitable Parent Doctrine: The Future of Custody
and Visitation Rights for Same-Sex Partners in Missouri, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 283,
294-95 (2006) (identifying various statutory tools used by courts to approve second-parent
adoptions). For a comprehensive overview of statutory interpretation, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2006).
69. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 844-45; In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d at 892-96; In re
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d at 537-39.
70. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 859-62; In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d at
1256-57; In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d at 539-41; In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d at 402-06; In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1202-03 (Pa. 2002) (relying on the
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[W]here, as here, the prospective adoptive parent and the biological

parent are both in fact acting as parents, Indiana law does not require a destructive choice between the two parents. Allowing continuation of the rights of both the biological and adoptive parent,
where compelled by the best interests of the child, is the only rational result.7
Legislative intent is another justification provided for exemption from
the biological parent's cut-off provision. Some courts concluded that the
provision was not intended to apply to any situation in which a current
parent was, in fact, a party to the adoption.72 Such an analysis closely
parallels the "absurd results" argument in that the legislative intent is
derived by concluding that the legislature could not have meant the result
produced by the statute. 73 In perhaps a further-reaching analysis, some
courts analogized the same-sex couple's adoption to a step-parent adoption, bringing the same-sex couple within the exemption from the requirement of termination of parental rights. 74 Finally, courts pointed to
75
the lack of any express prohibition of allowing the adoption to proceed.
Each of the opinions grappled with issues of statutory construction,
thus side-stepping any potential constitutional arguments. In doing so,
however, no single canon of statutory interpretation decisively resolved
the issue. Rather, a combination of various interpretative tools, applied

plain language of the statute, but concluding that the statute in fact conferred discretion to
the trial judge to waive the statutory requirements in the best interest of the child). But see
In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 382 (Neb. 2002) (reading the statute to not allow
co-adoptions except in specifically allowed step-parent adoptions).
71. In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d at 1260 (citation omitted).
72. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 860-62; Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 321
("The Legislature obviously did not intend that a natural parent's legal relationship to its
child be terminated when the natural parent is a party to the adoption petition.").
73. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 859-62; In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d
at 1256-57; In reAdoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 at 539-41; In reJacob,
660 N.E.2d at 402-06; In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1202-03.
74. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 860 ("[T]he stepparent exception easily applies here
by analogy; Bruce and Mark are living together in a committed personal relationship, as
though married, and are jointly caring for Hillary as their child."); In re Adoption of K.S.P.,
804 N.E.2d at 1260 (citing In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995)); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d
at 405 ("[The cut-off provision,] designed as a shield to protect new adoptive families, was
never intended as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial interfamily adoptions by second
parents.").
75. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 318-19 (noting the lack of any language
prohibiting two unmarried cohabitating persons from jointly adopting or any language
prohibiting a person from adopting their own child); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d at
1201 ("Unless the courtfor cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall
be entered unless the natural parent or parents' rights have been terminated .... (emphasis added) (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901 (2001))).
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in a seemingly patchwork fashion, ultimately developed the opinions.
Perhaps arriving at the desired result required such a combination of
tools. At least one commentator has suggested the process calls on
"judges to massage
the language of outdated statutes to obtain the de76
sired result.",

D. JudicialDecisions ProhibitingSecond-ParentAdoptions
Appellate decisions in three states currently prevent second-parent
adoptions by same-sex couples: Nebraska,77 Ohio,7 8 and Wisconsin.7 9
Each of the decisions found no constitutional claims at issue, instead focusing exclusively on statutory interpretation.8" All three courts employed the so-called cut-off provision and concluded that the statutory
scheme of each state required relinquishment of the existing parent's
rights prior to an adoption. 8'
76. Heather Buethe, Note, Second-Parent Adoption and the Equitable Parent Doctrine: The Future of Custody and Visitation Rights for Same-Sex Partners in Missouri, 20
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 283, 294 (2006). For a discussion regarding the validity of judicial
determinations in second-parent adoptions, see Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a
Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-ParentAdoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933,
939-50 (2000).
77. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Neb. 2002) ("[A]s to the biological
parent, 'termination of his or her parental rights is the foundation of our adoption statutes.'
This pronouncement is reflected in the adoption statutes that require relinquishment or
termination prior to adoption, except when a stepparent adopts, and is further reflected in
case law .
(quoting In re Adoption of Kassandra B., 540 N.W. 2d 554, 558 (Neb.
1995))).
78. In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) ("R.C.
3107.15(A) provides that a final decree of adoption issued by an Ohio court has the effect
of terminating all parental rights of biological parents and creating parental rights in adoptive parents."). For a detailed examination of the status of second-parent adoptions in
Ohio, see generally Susan J. Becker, Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Couples in
Ohio: Unsettled and Unsettling Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101 (2000).
79. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wis. 1994) ("To avoid this absurd
result and to harmonize the rules of statutory construction discussed above, we hold that
the 'cut-off' provision of [Wis. STAT. § 48.92(2) (2008)] is mandatory.").
80. See In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 377; In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d
at 678. For an analysis of the constitutional implications in second-parent adoptions, see
generally Christopher Colorado, Note, Tying the Braid of Second-Parent Adoptions Where Due Process Meets Equal Protection, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425 (2005).
81. See In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 379.
[W]ith the exception of the stepparent adoption, the parent or parents possessing existing parental rights must relinquish the child "before any minor child may be
adopted by any adult person or persons." Under Nebraska's statutory adoption
scheme, the minor child, Luke, was not eligible for adoption by A.E. because B.P. had
not relinquished him and the county court's reading of the statute was correct. Id.
In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1073 ("ITihe trial court did not err in finding the
biological mother's parental rights would terminate upon adoption of the child by appel-
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In interpreting the statutes, two courts acknowledged the "best interest
of the child" standard,8 2 but both courts failed to follow the standard's
lead, and instead the arguments subsequently fell prey to a strict interpretation analysis. Both courts concluded that the plain language of each
state's step-parent adoption procedures was used to exclude the same-sex
that
couples. 83 Moreover, two courts referenced the "absurd results"
84
would result if the second-parent adoptions were permitted.
Despite some similar concerns, each state's opinion focused on distinct
issues in its analysis, a difference likely attributable to the particular arguments raised on appeal. The attention of the courts' reasoning focused on
a variety of issues, such as: refuting consent to an adoption as functionally
85
equivalent to relinquishment for purposes of the cut-off provision; applying the "best interest of the child" standard's application to the adop86
tion process, but not the effects of the adoption; and clarifying the
87
mandatory, as opposed to permissive, nature of the cut-off provision.
Despite these variations, a strict interpretation ultimately guided each
court's decision in each case.
lant, a non-stepparent."); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 683 ("Because Georgina's
parental rights remain intact, Angel is not eligible to be adopted by Annette.").
82. See In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1073 ("Best interest pertains to the
adoption process, not to the legal effects of the adoption."); In re Angel Lace M., 516
N.W.2d at 681 ("[T]he fact that an adoption - or any other action affecting a child - is in
the child's best interest, by itself, does not authorize a court to grant the adoption.").
83. See In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1073; In re Angel Lace M., 516
N.W.2d at 682 ("Our purpose in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature, with the plain language of the statute acting as our primary guide." (citing Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 361 N.W. 2d 673, 677 (Wis. 1985))); see also In re Adoption of R.B.F.,
803 A.2d at 1202 ("We note that our decision is not creating a judicial exception to the
requirements of the Adoption Act, but rather is applying the plain meaning of the terms
employed by the Legislature."). The Pennsylvania court also employed a strict interpretation of the statute acting, on its face, granted the trial court discretion to waive statutory
requirements. See id.
84. See In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 382 (concluding that the application of
the cut-off provision to step-parent adoption, which is explicitly provided for, would produce an absurd result); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 682-83 (refusing to construe a
statute so as to provide absurd results, as in, allowing a stranger to adopt a child while one
parent still retained legal rights to the child).
85. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 379-83 ("This section establishes a distinction between a consent and a relinquishment. Moreover, the statute clearly contemplates
that there will be circumstances under which there is a consent to an adoption, but not a
relinquishment.").
86. In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1072-73 ("Best interest pertains to the
adoption process, not to the legal effects of the adoption.").
87. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 683-85 ("To avoid this absurd result and
harmonize the rules of statutory construction ... we hold that the 'cut-off' provision.., is
mandatory.").
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E. Where the Issue Remains Unresolved
Given the limited number of states mentioned in the preceding sections, it is clear that the vast majority of states, in fact, remain unclear as
to the status of same-sex second-parent adoption. Within the realm of
those states with unresolved positions, two categories are generally identified. One category involves states in which trial courts have issued second-parent adoption decrees, but no appellate court has ruled on the
issue; the other category is those states where it remains unclear whether
second-parent adoption is permitted under the state adoption statutes.88
The former category includes fifteen states, while the latter accounts for
another twenty-two states.8 9 The generally unpublished status of trial
court opinions makes it difficult to determine how wide-spread the practice might be, while also preventing their use in subsequent citation.90
For example, in Schott v. Schott,9a the Iowa Supreme Court considered
a district court's ruling that same-sex second-parent adoptions were impermissible under the state's adoption statute.92 The case arose when a
lesbian couple's relationship ended, resulting in a petition for determination of custody and support. 93 Although an Iowa trial court had previously issued two second-parent adoption decrees to the couple, the trial
court in the current case concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because the adoptions were at odds with the state's
statute and therefore invalid. 94 The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed and
88. NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION IN THE U.S.
(2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue maps/2nd-parent
_adoption 5_07.pdf (distinguishing graphically between all the states' position on secondparent adoptions).
89. Id. (showing that trial courts have permitted second-parent adoptions in the following states: Alabama; Alaska; Delaware; Hawaii; Iowa; Louisiana; Maryland; Michigan;
Minnesota; Nevada; New Mexico; Oregon; Rhode Island; Texas; and Washington). The
states categorized as "unclear" include Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
90. Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93, 96 (2000).
91. 744 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 2008).
92. Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa 2008) ("The district court held chapter
600, which governs adoptions, does not allow an unmarried adult to adopt a child without
terminating the parental rights of both natural parents.").
93. Id. at 86 ("Jamie and Heather were in a committed relationship, which lasted several years. They have two children. Jamie is the children's natural parent and Heather is
the children's adoptive parent. After the parties ended their relationship, Heather filed a
petition requesting a determination on child custody, physical care, and support.").
94. Id. ("The [district] court reasoned that because Heather was a legal stranger to the
children, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on her petition."). The
couple (Heather and Jamie) began a relationship in 2000. Id. Heather adopted Jamie's son
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held that the trial court did, in fact, have subject matter jurisdiction over
the petition as neither adoption was appealed, making the final judg95
ments conclusive on collateral attack. Framing the issue as a jurisdictional question, the decision specifically avoided the underlying question
of whether same-sex second-parent adoptions were permissible in the
state.96 Thus, in doing so, the uncertainty of second-parent adoptions will
continue in Iowa. Iowa trial courts will continue to take differing positions while the issue will remain unresolved on both judicial and legislative fronts.
A recent article documenting a cross-country trip meeting with samesex adoptive couples noted a general hesitancy in the "ambiguous" states
to openly discuss the adoption process, including one state leader's admission that if it became known that gays were adopting, legislation
9
prohibiting the practice would necessarily result. " Moreover, the judicial
ambiguities have led to the development of make-shift systems of advocates and attorneys designed to steer potential parents to judges known
98
to grant same-sex parents second-parent adoptions.
These unresolved states form the focus of this Note. While states with
clear policies regarding same-sex second-parent adoptions form the foundation of the analysis, such analysis aims to develop the best alternative
for same-sex parents in the face of the continued inability to legally
marry. In other words, the goal is to identify the best process by which
same-sex parents may gain the protections afforded to heterosexual
couples and therefore, the most legally sound parentage arrangement.

in 2001 through a second-parent adoption after the natural father's parental rights were

terminated. Id. Following artificial insemination by an anonymous donor, Jamie gave

birth to a daughter in 2004. Id. A second-parent adoption was also secured by the couple
the same year to add Heather as a parent. Id.
95. Id. at 88 ("[A] final judgment is conclusive on collateral attack, even if the judgment was erroneous, unless the court that entered the judgment lacked jurisdiction over

the person or the subject matter.").
96. Id. at 89 ("We need not decide whether second parent adoptions are permissible
in Iowa for purposes of this appeal. Even if the district court who issued the adoption

decrees misinterpreted Iowa's adoption statute, the adoptions are not void.").
97. John Ireland, 50 Ways to Adopt a Baby, ADVOCATE, Aug. 28, 2007, at 39, 39 ("Lesson learned: In rural and conservative areas, the adoption closet can be a beneficial,
though unfortunate, tool.").
98. See Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 2007, at 142, 145
(describing private agencies known for assisting same-sex couples with adoption that have
also emerged); see also Susan E. Dalton, Protecting Our Parent-ChildRelationships:Understanding the Strengths and Weaknesses of Second-Parent Adoption, in QUEER FAMILIES,
QUEER POLITICS 215 (Mary Bernstein & Renate Reimann eds., 2001) (describing the
word-of-mouth system used to distribute information regarding same-sex adoption).
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F. Outcomes Assessment
This section seeks to provide the reader with a set of basic observations
that may be valuable in attempting to evaluate the future of second-parent adoptions for same-sex couples, and is not intended to provide an indepth analysis of empirical data of an otherwise intricate nature. Table 1,
below, summarizes the current state of the law as to second-parent adoptions by same-sex couples, while Table 2 tracks each state's legal position
with respect to same-sex marriage. 99

TABLE 1

Same-Sex
Second-Parent Adoption
Position
Statutorily Permitted

Years of Decision/
Enactment

Number of States
O; CT; VT]
7

1995 2000 2004 2007

Judicially Permitted

[DC; IL; IN; MA;
N J; NY;
PA]
NJ;NY;PA]

1993 1995 1995 1995
1995 2002 2003 2004

Statutorily Prohibited

3 UT]
[FL; MS;

1977 2000 2000

Judicially Prohibited

3
[NE; OH; WI]
15
22

Granted by Trial Courts
Unclear

1994 1998 2002

99. See supra Parts II.A-E. For the purposes of Table 1 located in the text, fifty-four
jurisdictions are listed in Table 1, accounting for all states, the District of Columbia, and
double entries for Florida, Mississippi, and Utah, which are included under both "Statutorily Prohibited" and "Unclear." In the "Judicially Permitted" row of Table 1, a total of
eight entries are listed for "Years of Decision/Enactment" to account for two Indiana
cases. See In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re
Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). For a summary of state
positions on same-sex marriage, see NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY
MEASURES IN THE U.S. (2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/ reports/issue-maps/GayMarriage-09_25_07.pdf; NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE

U.S. (2008), available at http://

www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/relationship
pdf.
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TABLE

Same-Sex
Second-Parent Adoption
Position

2

State Recognition of Same-Sex Relationship
(Marriage, Civil Union, etc.)
Banned
Provided

Statutorily Permitted
Judicially Permitted
Statutorily Prohibited
Judicially Prohibited
Granted by Trial Courts
Unclear

3
3
0
0
1
0

1
3
3
3
12
21

A quick look at these figures reveals that eleven jurisdictions currently
permit second-parent adoptions, while a total of six prohibit it. Legislation superseding negative judicial decisions in both Connecticut and Colorado, however, is the key to this difference. Prior to legislation
°° a total of eight states prohibsuperseding previous judicial decisions,
ited the practice, making for a much closer differential.
Not surprisingly, the jurisdictions permitting second-parent adoptions
tend to occur in more liberal areas, while those prohibiting the practice
tend to be more conservative areas. 1 ' Of the eleven jurisdictions currently allowing second-parent adoptions, more than half also provide
10 2
Three of the eleven
some form of recognition to same-sex couples.
states have statutes banning same-sex marriage and one has a constitu0 3 Of the six prohibiting states, all
tional amendment banning the same.'
100. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-a724 (West 2008) (superseding In re Adoption
of Baby Z., 724 1035, 1055 (Conn.1999)); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203 (West 2007)
(superseding In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996)).
101. Florida may very well be debatable as to its label as "conservative," particularly
compared to Utah and Mississippi; however, Florida's statute was enacted over thirty years
ago in 1977. All three judicial decisions prohibiting the practice are centered in the
Midwest.
102.

NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION FOR SAME-

(2008), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue maps/relationship-recognition_2_08.pdf (showing how Massachusetts permits
same-sex marriage; Connecticut, Vermont, and New Jersey permit civil unions; and the
District of Columbia has a limited domestic partner registry program); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (striking down California's same-sex marriage ban).
103. NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY MEASURES IN THE U.S. (2007),
available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/GayMarriage-0925 07.pdf (noting that Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania statutorily ban same-sex marriage, while Colorado passed a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage in 2007).
SEX COUPLES IN THE

U.S.
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six have a constitutional amendment or statute banning gay marriage.1 °4
While direct causation between banning gay marriage and prohibiting
second-parent adoptions may not necessarily exist, a correlation exists
between any prohibiting decision or legislation and a state's prohibition
of gay marriage.' 1 5 With nearly thirty states banning gay marriage since
2000,106 protecting the legal status of same-sex couples functioning as, or
intending to be, parents requires pro-active action. An argument as to
the correct path of such action, thus, forms the focus of this Note.
Interestingly, judicial decisions (of either outcome) were concentrated
during the time period ranging from the mid-1990s through the early
2000s, while statutory provisions permitting second-parent adoptions appear to be the most evenly distributed in terms of occurrence. Also of
note, the most recent activity on either side of the fence was Colorado's
2007 legislation permitting the practice, 0 7 while the last prohibition came
in 2002.108
Each of the different state statutes permitting the practice expressly
provide, in varying forms, for the ability of same-sex couples to adopt. 109
On the other hand, the statutes that prohibit a second-parent adoption do
not fall under the second-parent or step-parent adoption sections, but
104. Id. (showing the correlation by which states banning same-sex adoption also ban
gay marriage).
105. See Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 2007, at 142, 284 (noting the same concern). "They [same-sex couples] have reason to worry. In the fall of 2005,
Texans approved by a landslide a state constitutional amendment ... to ban gay marriage.
At its core, the debate over gay parenting turns on the same fundamental question that the
gay marriage referendum posed: What makes a family?" Id. With the exception of Nebraska, each state prohibiting second-parent adoption took its prohibiting action prior to
its later ban on gay marriage. Compare NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY
MEASURES IN THE U.S. (2007), availableat http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/
issuejmaps/GayMarriage 09_25_07.pdf (showing states that have banned same-sex marriage either by statute or constitutional amendment), with NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK
FORCE, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION IN THE U.S.

(2007), available at http://www.thetask

force.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/2nd-parent-adoption_5_07.pdf (showing states
that have allowed or prohibited second-parent adoption).
106. NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY MEASURES IN THE U.S. (2007),
available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue maps/GayMarriage_09_
25-07.pdf.
107. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203 (West 2007) (granting the right of secondparent adoption). In this context, the 2008 Iowa case should not be considered as the most
recent activity because it failed to resolve whether the state's statute allowed for same-sex
second-parent adoption, but instead solidified the ambiguity by deciding the case on jurisdictional grounds. See Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Iowa 2008) (refusing to address
the permissibility of second-parent adoptions).
108. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W. 2d at 376.
109. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102

(2002).
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rather provide categorical prohibitions.1" And as noted previously, the
focus of prior decisions has centered on the application of the biological
parent cut-off provision and whether a same-sex couple could be exempt
from the requirement of relinquishing the first parent's parental rights,
similar to a step-parent adoption.'11
When considering this summary in light of its attempt to provide a
snapshot of state positions, the overwhelmingly unclear status of the situation becomes apparent, with some thirty-plus states notably absent from
the summary. Moreover, and perhaps most useful, this information demonstrates the truly difficult nature of making any generalizations regarding the history of second-parent adoptions in the context of same-sex
couples. Accordingly, Part III highlights the various advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.
III.

ANALYSIS

Admittedly, the number of conceivable arguments for or against legislative reform and judicial challenges is limitless. This section simply highlights the most relevant of such arguments, with an eye toward both past
outcomes and future results. In doing so, the emphasis is on those considerations which may help facilitate a decision as to the best possible route
for same-sex couples to pursue in securing parental rights. Moreover, the
significant interplay between these two institutional routes of reform
must be acknowledged."l 2 As such, the analysis identifies the ways in
which the two, at times, appear to be co-dependent on one another.
A. Advantages of Legislative Reform
Adoption is a creature of statute, making the legislature a natural setting for adoption reform. 1 3 Indeed, a number of judges, in prohibiting a
second-parent adoption based on statutory language, have noted that the
ability of same-sex couples to execute second-parent adoptions remains a
legislative issue.1 14 In perhaps the most well-articulated example of this
110. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2007); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3
(2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117 (West 2008).
111. See supra Part II.C-D.
112. See Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54
DRAKE L. REV. 861, 879 (2006) (discussing the advances and backlashes associated with
the judicial and legislative pursuit of gay rights issues).
113. See, e.g., In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 681 ("Adoption proceedings,
unknown at common law, are of statutory origin and the essential statutory requirements
must be substantially met to validate the proceedings.").
114. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1060 (Conn. 1999), superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 2008) ("The members of our
legislature, as elected representatives of the people, have the power and responsibility to
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position, Judge Geske's concurring opinion in In re Angel Lace M.
explains:
Hopefully our legislators will continue to work to advance the interests and protection of our children by listening to their constituents,
reviewing our current laws, and debating the wisdom of statutory
changes. Children cannot protect their own interests. The legislature can protect those interests by vigilantly overseeing the children's
code and ensuring a statutory scheme that indeed provides for the
15
best interests of our kids."
Such language demonstrates the ability of a court to side-step the issue
by simply referring it to the legislature for resolution. The Connecticut
legislature heeded such advice1 16 by subsequently amending its statute to
provide for expanded coverage of second-parent adoptions." 7 Determining law in the legislature as opposed to the judiciary indicates a state's
firm public policy against liberal interpretation of statute, essentially leaving legislative reform as the only mechanism by which to facilitate
change. This seems rational given that the traditional adoption structure
providing for married and single, unmarried persons resulted from the
legislative's inability to foresee gay couples (two unmarried adults) needing access to adoption, in the absence of the ability to marry.' 8 Given
the less controversial nature of same-sex adoption when compared to the
marriage issue, the viability of amending the statutes to explicitly provide
for second-parent adoption seems like a viable option.1 19
Legislation also provides a much more permanent protection to gay
and lesbian parents, as they become subject to statutory coverage and
thus removed from the possible fluctuations that a judicial ruling proestablish the requirements for adoption in this state."); In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719
N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (Wise, J., concurring) ("[T]his is a legislative issue
for the General Assembly."); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 687 (Geske, J., concurring) ("The legislators, as representatives for the people of this state, have both the right
and the responsibility to establish the requirements for legal adoption, for custody, and for
visitation. This court cannot play that role.").
115. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 678 (Geske, J., concurring).
116. In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d at 1060 (stating that the legislature has the
responsibility rather than the court to allow second-parent adoption).

117. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 2008) (allowing a second person to
share parental responsibilities upon consent of a parent, as long as the other biological
parent's rights have been terminated).
118. See Susan E. Dalton, Protecting Our Parent-ChildRelationships: Understanding
the Strengths and Weaknesses of Second-Parent Adoption, in QUEER FAMILIES, QUEER
POLITIcs 205 (Mary Bernstein & Renate Reimann eds., 2001).
119. See Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 2007, at 142, 145 ("In
the past ten years, 26 states have amended their constitutions to outlaw gay marriage. Parallel efforts to ban gay parenting have been less successful-thus far.").
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vides. As a result, many pro-active voter initiatives to ban gay parenting
may also subside.1 2 1 In essence, the legislation would settle the question
of a second adoption's validity and eliminate any such question from lying within the purview of a single judge or set of judges. The legislative
path also prevents the public perception of judicial activism. This also
inherently eliminates much of the statutory interpretation currently necessary to bring otherwise ambiguous family law statutes into the more
modern conception of parenting.
In terms of a state's public policy concerns, statutory reform provides
the opportunity for legislatures to dictate the exact scope of second-parent adoptions. 121 Such a scope could very well, and likely would, include
more than same-sex couples in its coverage.' 22 This possibility offers perhaps the most substantial advantage of same-sex couples pursuing the
legislative route. That is, the pursuit of legislative reform provides the
gay and lesbian community the unique opportunity to form coalitions
with other groups, beyond the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
(LGBT) community. 123 In other areas in which the LGBT community
seeks reform, such as employment discrimination or marriage rights, no
other class of people is subject to the same treatment, leaving gays and
lesbians to pursue their rights alone. The regulation of second-parent
adoption, however, affects not only same-sex couples, but any unmarried
124
person seeking legal parentage through second-parent adoption.

120. See Amanda Paulson, Several States Weigh Ban on Gay Adoption, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 15, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0315/
p02s02-ussc.html (explaining that while gay adoption is still a divisive issue, it is not as
contentious as gay marriage, which explains why efforts to ban gay adoption have not been

as successful as attempts to ban gay marriage, at least, according to conservatives).
121. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (West 2008) (allowing the partner of a
parent to adopt a child of the parent if in the best interest of the child), with CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 2008) (authorizing the parent of a minor child to agree in
writing with another person who shares parental responsibility for the child that such person shall adopt or join in the adoption of the minor child).
122. See COALITION FOR ADOPTION RIGHTS EQUALITY, SECOND PARENT ADOPTION:
A MEASURE TO PROTECT MICHIGAN'S CHILDREN 4 (2007), available at http://www.michci-

tizenaction.org/assets/pdf/SPA.pdf ("Second parent adoption will benefit any child in
which there are two unmarried adults working together to raise children, or, any family in
which there is a single guardian who wishes to have help from another trusted adult."). For
a thorough consideration of the scope of family law's coverage, see generally Laura A.
Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007).

123. See Tim Padgett, Gay Family Values, TIME, July 16, 2007, at 51, available at http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1640411,00.html (showing how more than just
a minority, such as homosexuals, are interested in getting second-parent adoptions).
124. Id. (including an unmarried person, such as an aunt, uncle, or grandparent, in
addition to non-relatives).
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Colorado demonstrates not only the possibility of a legislative coalition, but also the necessity of such support. As one commentator noted
regarding the recent passage of the Colorado legislation permitting second-parent adoption, "[I]t wasn't [designed as] a gay-adoption bill. It was
a second-parent adoption bill that allows unmarried heterosexuals to
adopt jointly. It was presented predominantly as child-friendly, not gayfriendly, and therefore ran less risk of alienating potential supporters
than gay marriage does. '' 12 5 In doing so, Colorado also demonstrates the
ability to secure same-sex second-parent legislation despite significant obstacles including both an adverse appellate decision and a same-sex marriage ban.
B.

Disadvantagesof Legislative Reform

Legislative reform of adoption statutes faces many of the same challenges that generally impede legislation-time, speed, and the parties involved. Legislation often takes a significant time commitment in order to
gather the support necessary to pass legislation. It also appears that action on the part of the legislature, at least in the context of permitting
same-sex second-parent adoptions, may be partly prompted by a previous
judicial decision on the issue. 1 26 This trend,
however, is not seen when
127
practice.
the
prohibit
legislation seeks to
Obtaining both the necessary support and action-provoking appellate
decision requires a lengthy process. States in which legislatures may meet
as rarely as once every two years further compound the time consideration. 2 8 When compared to the judicial route, the legislative route requires the involvement of many more parties, both in terms of actual
legislators, as well as supporters of the legislation. Of course, such a process also necessarily entails the involvement of the general population
who may voice varying opinions to their representatives. At least one
commentator has cautioned against the often overstated idea of "robust

125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting, in part, Seth Grob, a family law
attorney practicing in Colorado); see also April M. Washington, Senate OKs Adoption by
Same-Sex Couples, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/government/article/0,2777,DRMN_23906_5479666,00.html; Jeff
LeBlanc, My Two Moms: An Analysis of the Status of Homosexual Adoption and the Challenges to Its Acceptance, 27 J. Juv. L. 95, 96 (2006) (arguing that allowing same-sex couples
to adopt is not an issue of gay rights, but is an issue of the best interest of the child).
126. See supra Part II.A.
127. See supra Part II.B.
128. See Paul Jenks, CongressLine by Gallery Watch.com: The State Legislatures,June

18, 2006, http://www.llrx.com/congress/statelegislatures.htm ("[M]ost states meet only for a
short time, usually for a couple of months a year, sometimes every two years. If you follow
the state legislatures, your busy time is January-June with the busiest months being February through April. Most states do not have full time legislators.").
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legislative accountability and responsiveness"12' 9 by suggesting that legislatures "cannot always be counted on to reflect, or to act consistently,
with public opinion. 1130
C. Advantages of Judicial Challenges
Many of the advantages of judicial challenges to second-parent adoption statutes directly counter the disadvantages of statutory reform offered in the previous section. That is, judicial challenges generally
provide a quicker result than legislation, while involving a smaller number of people. 3 While the litigation may involve other interest groups,
the core of the decision lies with the panel of judges, eliminating much of
the need for consensus on a broader scale.1 32 Moreover, rather than requiring consensus building and a principled agreement as to the statutory
coverage, a judicial challenge rests solely on arguing the ambiguity of the
as compared to a directed efstatute and the appropriate interpretation,
1 33
statutorily.
ambiguity
the
resolve
to
fort
The apparent success rate perhaps offers the most significant advantage
of judicial reform. Of the ten appellate opinions currently regulating second-parent adoptions, 134 seven have approved the inclusion of same-sex
couples, while only three have prohibited it. Furthermore, no decision
135
permitting the practice has been subsequently reversed by legislation.
Any excitement regarding this success rate, however, should be tempered
by the overwhelming number of states that have passed gay marriage
136
prohibitions in recent years, which may impact future outcomes.
Moreover, this success rate is derived solely from appellate decisions. In
129. Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation,Social Change,and the Courts, 54 DRAKE L.
REV. 861, 879 (2006) (citing Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 737, 575-60 (2004)).
130. Id. at 880 (showing a disconnect between public opinion and actions by state
legislatures).
131. See supra Part III.B.
132. Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation,Social Change,and the Courts, 54 DRAKE L.
REV. 861, 882 (2006) ("It is unconvincing to lay it all at the door of public opinion. There is
little reason .. .to suspect that there was significant public support for protecting gay
governmental employees in 1969 . . .or for recognizing gay campus groups . . .or for
second parent adoption beginning in the mid-1980s.").
133. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass 1993) ("To the extent that
any ambiguity or vagueness exists in the statute, judicial construction should enhance,
rather than defeat, its purpose.").
134. See supra Part II.C-D.
135. See Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54
DRAKE L. REV. 861, 877 (2006) ("Indeed, not a single state court decision granting a second-parent adoption has been overturned by legislation.").
136. See NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY MEASURES IN THE U.S.
(2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/GayMar-
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the absence of an adverse ruling, no appeal of an adoption petition would
exist, thus eliminating the possibility of an appellate opinion on the matter. The ability of same-sex couples to forum shop to secure an adoption
13 7
decree may also artificially deflate the number of appellate opinions.
D. Disadvantages of Judicial Challenges
The most significant disadvantage of a judicial challenge to a state's
second-parent adoption statute is the risk entailed with statutory interpretation. Such interpretation remains unpredictable and ultimately
leaves same-sex couples rolling the dice as to their future parental status.
As one court has noted, "The trial judge reached her result by making a
decision to employ 'strict construction' .....

The judge, however, just as

easily could have opted for a 'liberal interpretation."' 138 Moreover, the
evolving nature of statutory interpretation allows it to change not only
over time, but also as multiple judges evaluate a case, each of whom has
various approaches to statutory interpretation. From the public perspective, the idea of judicial activism also surfaces in this context.' 39 And of
course, judges "can harbor irrational fears or adhere to unfair myths"
when exercising broad discretionary power relative to same-sex adoptions. 4 ° Indeed, at least one study has concluded that judges often rely
on traditional conceptions of family when evaluating same-sex secondparent adoptions.1 4 '
In spite of this uncertainty, the judicial process can produce a positive
result, but the long-term viability of such a decision remains debatable.
First, the decision could be reversed in much quicker fashion than that of
riage_09.25 07.pdf (showing an uneasy tension between stances on gay marriage versus
stances on same-sex adoptions).
137. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (explaining how prospective parents can seek adoptions in states that allow it).
138. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 839, (D.C. 1995).
139. For an argument regarding the propriety of judicial resolution of second-parent
adoptions, see Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Familiesin a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures
and Second-ParentAdoption, 75 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 933, 939-50 (2000).

140. Amy D. Ronner, Gay and Lesbian Adoption: Banishing the Pied Piper, 18 ST.
L. REV. 207, 207-08 (2005) (describing how some courts, in considering gay adoption issues, labor under the unfounded notion that gays and lesbians are "dangerous suspects" unfit for contact with children); see STEPHEN HICKS & JANET MCDERMOTt,
LESBIAN AND GAY FOSTERING AND ADOPTION 11-14 (Stephen Hicks & Janet McDermott
eds., 1999) (dispelling misconceptions often associated with same-sex couples).
141. Catherine Connolly, The Description of Gay and Lesbian Families in Second-

THOMAS

ParentAdoption Cases, in THE GAY & LESBIAN MARRIAGE & FAMILY READER 109-25

(Jennifer M. Lehmann ed., 2001) ("[Glay and lesbian petitioners encounter numerous
problems in child custody cases. Judges have often ignored all other considerations commonly associated with a determination of the child's best interests when the mother is a
lesbian.").

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol11/iss1/3

26

Plowman: When Second-Parent Adoption is the Second-Best Option: The Case f

2008]

SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION

legislation being repealed. Second, courts may narrowly tailor the issue
to prevent a holding that would broadly alter the state's adoption regime.
In Iowa, for example, the state supreme court resolved its case on the
grounds of subject matter jurisdiction and specifically declined to decide
whether a same-sex second-parent adoption was valid in the state. 4n Finally, the future success rate of judicial challenges remains very unclear.
With the new wave of same-sex marriage bans since 2000, it is questionable how courts will resolve the second-parent adoption statute's ambiguity in the future.' 4 3 Courts may very well align their future decisions with
the state's ban on gay marriage by also prohibiting second-parent adoptions by same-sex couples.14 4 The new wave of bans may also lead to
bans in additional states as current voter initiatives would seek to implement. 1 45 Indeed, a one line addition to the adoption code (explicitly
prohibiting homosexuals or same-sex couples from adopting) can elimi-6
nate any possibility of a second-parent adoption by a same-sex couple.'1
The parties involved in a case suggest another inherent risk of litigating
the issue of second-parent adoptions. Litigation requires a couple to petition the court for a second-parent adoption in the face of an ambiguous
or prohibiting statute. The couple, therefore, must necessarily place their
parentage status at risk by seeking the decree (instead of relying on a
state that explicitly allows the adoption). If the couple successfully
secures the decree, their personal interests are indeed satisfied, but the
ability to appeal is then eliminated. Fifteen states currently present this
142. See Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa 2008) (refusing to address the
validity of a second-parent adoption, instead giving preclusive effect to the lower court's
initial adoption decree as it was issued with proper jurisdiction).
143. See NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY MEASURES IN THE U.S.
(2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/GayMarriage_09 25 07.pdf. But see Tim Padgett, Gay Family Values, TIME, July 16, 2007, at 51,
4
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1640 11,00.html (illustrating
how Colorado, despite state law prohibiting same-sex marriage, has recently passed legislation permitting second-parent adoption).
144. See Vanessa A. Lavely, Comment, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Reconciling the Inconsistencies Between Marriageand Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 247, 286 (2007) (arguing that courts should incorporate updated conceptions of family law into same-sex marriages). The argument, however, would only apply to states in
which same-sex adoption is, in fact, allowed. See id. In the remaining states, it is just as
feasible that the conceptions could be parallel to the state's ban on gay marriage, thereby
also prohibiting adoption. See id.
145. See Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up in 16 States, USA ToDAY, Feb. 20, 2006, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20gay-adoption.x.htm ("Steps to pass laws or secure November ballot initiatives are underway in at least 16 states, adoption, gay rights and conservative groups say.").
146. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2007) (stating, by statute, that homosexuals
are ineligible to adopt); see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (West 2004); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-6-117 (West 2008).
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but no appellate

decisions. 147
Similarly, the judicial route does not necessarily ensure advancement
of the ideal case. That is, any couple may appeal a denied adoption, possibly leading to an appellate decision that may not accurately reflect the
best case for second-parent adoption. In Texas, for example, a lesbian is
currently fighting for sole custody of her biological daughter and claims
that the second-parent adoption by her former partner is void. 148 The
adoption has been upheld by three judges, but further appeals continue
to be pursued. 149 A same-sex couple successfully raising a child, seeking
the legal protection of two parents, likely offers the ideal party to an appeal. This contrasts significantly with a custody dispute claiming a void
150
adoption decree from six years previous, as is the situation in Texas.
Nevertheless, the story highlights the potential problem of the inability to
plan and execute a successful appeal if the case arises earlier in a different
context, involving less-than-ideal parties.
IV.

CONCLUSION

"[T]he task at hand is gaining legal recognition for the multiple variations of modern family life as they already exist.' 151 Within those multiple variations, second-parent adoptions are merely one avenue for samesex couples seeking the same legal protections afforded to their heterosexual counterparts. Until marriage equality is secured for same-sex
couples, the struggle for second-parent adoptions will remain a critical

147.

NAT'L GAY

&

LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION IN THE U.S.

(2007), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/2nd-parent
.adoption_5_07.pdf (showing trial decisions in Alabama; Alaska; Delaware; Hawaii; Iowa;
Louisiana; Maryland; Michigan; Minnesota; Nevada; New Mexico; Oregon; Rhode Island;
Texas; and Washington).
148. Fighting for Custody. Second Parent Adoption Jeopardized in Texas,
PROUDPARENTING.COM, July 21, 2007, http://www.proudparenting.com/node/493 ("The

daughter's biological mother, Julie Anne Hobbs, claims the 2001 adoption by her former
partner, Janet Kathleen Van Stavern, is void.").
149. Id. While this situation may lead to a definitive answer regarding the status of
second-parent adoptions in Texas, the court could also choose, like Iowa, to resolve the
case on jurisdictional grounds. See Schott v. Schott, 744 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Iowa 2008).

150. See Fighting for Custody. Second Parent Adoption Jeopardized in Texas,
July 21, 2007, http://www.proudparenting.com/node/493 (showing

PROUDPARENTING.COM,

the biological parent to be disputing the legal rights of her previous partner).
151. Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93, 99 (2000)

(showing how the attitudes of society may have changed over the years, but now the laws
must catch up).
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law frameconsideration as gays and lesbians "struggle to fit into a family152
families.
as
existence
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Unfortunately, the majority of states remain unclear with respect to
second-parent adoptions. Synthesizing the various considerations outlined in the previous section, the argument exists that legislative reform
offers the more advantageous route for same-sex couples pursuing legal
recognition of their parental rights. The unpredictable nature of statutory
construction, particularly in the face of sweeping bans on same-sex marriage and mounting momentum to add restrictions on adoption, make
statutory reform the preferred route for same-sex couples. 153 This proactive solution allows same-sex couples to couch the legislation as prochild, thereby garnering support extending past the gay and lesbian community, while also eliminating the ambiguity previously functioning as a
stumbling block.15 4
The statutory language necessary to implement the change proposed in
this Note will vary according to a state's position with respect to recognition of a same-sex relationship. States providing for some form of relationship recognition (marriage, civil unions, domestic partner registry,
etc.) presumably provide same-sex couples the same benefits of marriage. 1 55 As such, same-sex couples would likely fall within the scope of
step-parent adoptions and would not encounter the cut-off provision required for other types of adoptions.' 5 6 Legislation, however, could still
specifically amend the adoption code's references to step-parent adoption
to include, alongside "spouse," the applicable term such as "partner."
In states banning gay marriage, the legislation would remain gender
neutral and focus on amending the cut-off provision which requires a par5 7 By
ent to terminate parental rights prior to an adoption proceeding.
focusing on the cut-off provision, as opposed to amending the secondparent adoption provision, the legislation avoids the issue of any relationship recognition. In doing so, the legislation remains pro-child, and less
centered on gay rights, thus allowing an anticipated increase in support.
The provision would be amended to exempt a parent from the termina152. Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a

Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 21 (1999) (noting the emotional trauma that can result
from not being afforded the same parental rights).
153. See supra Part III.
154. See supra Part III.A-D.
155. See Nate Blakeslee, Family Values, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 2007, at 142, 284 (show-

ing benefits of marriage as it pertains to what to expect in certain situations when a child is
co-adopted). The benefits afforded to same-sex couples in these states are exclusively
state-level benefits, and do not involve any benefits on the federal level. See id.
156. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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tion requirement when said parent is a party to the adoption. That is,
when the legal parent of a child consents to the adoption by a second
parent, the termination of previous parental rights would not be required
in order for an adoption to proceed. The same approach should be followed in states without gay marriage bans so as to ensure the continued
viability of the statute in the face of a later marriage ban.
Such legislation ultimately results in a predictable, more enduring
framework-allowing same-sex couples to secure their legal parentage,
and more importantly, providing children the legal protection of both
parents.
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